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INTRODUCTION

Most environmental laws contain provisions allowing private
groups or individuals to bring actions against alleged polluters or gov
ernment agencies for violations of environmental statutes. 1 These
"citizen suit" provisions have become an important feature of modern
environmental litigation. As a Senate report stated, "[c]itizen suits are
a proven enforcement tool. They operate as Congress intended-to
both spur and supplement ... government enforcement actions. They
have deterred violators and achieved significant compliance gainS."2
• This article was a finalist in the 1990 ATLA Environmental Law Contest.
•• Law Clerk to Justice Alfred V. Covello, Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1990-91.
B.S., 1981, M.S., 1985, University of Massachusetts; J.D., Western New England College
School of Law, 1990.
The author acknowledges the kind support and guidance offered by Professor Denis
Binder throughout the research and writing of this article.
1. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 831 F.2d 889, 890 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 110 S.
Ct. 304 (1989); see Clean Air Act § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1988); Federal Water
Pollution Control Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988); Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act § 105(g), 33 U.S.C. § 141S(g) (1988); Noise Control Act § 12, 42 U.S.c.
§ 4911 (1988); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988);
Toxic Substances Control Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1988); Safe Drinking Water Act
§ 1449, 42 U.S.C. § 300(j)-8 (1988); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act § 520,
30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1988); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act § 23(a), 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)
(1988); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act § 310,
42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1988); Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control LaWs,
Part II, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (EnvtI. L. Inst.) 10063 (1984).
2. S. REP. No. 50, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1985) ("In the past two years, the
number of citizen suits to enforce [National Pollution Discharge Elimination System] per
1
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Only two statutory requirements must be met in order to file a citizen
suit. The first is that before acting, the citizen plaintiff must give sixty
days' notice to the alleged violator, the federal Environmental Protec
tion Agency ("EPA"), and any state environmental agencies. 3 The
second is that the suit may be commenced only if the appropriate gov
ernment agency is not already "diligently pursuing" its own action.4
In the recent decision of Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,s the
United States Supreme Court resolved a split in the United States
Courts of Appeals regarding notice in the context of citizen suits.
Before Hallstrom, some courts of appeals used a "jurisdictional pre
requisite" approach and held that sixty days' notice is an absolute re
quirement of subject matter jurisdiction. 6 Other courts have used a
"pragmatic/functional" approach and concluded that the sixty-day
notice provision is a procedural, not a jurisdictional, requirement. 7
The two approaches can produce significantly different results. A
plaintiffs failure to meet a requirement of subject matter jurisdiction
can be raised at any point in the suit by either party, or even by the
court sua sponte. This would result in immediate dismissal for lack of
authority to hear the case. S Conversely, failure to meet a procedural
requirement is much less serious and often can be cured by simply
granting a stay of proceedings.
mits has surged so that such suits now constitute a substantial portion of all enforcement
actions ... under this Act."); see Comment, Environmental Law--Citizen Suits and Recov
ery o/Civil Penalties, 36 U. KAN. L. REv. 529, 532 (1988).
3. Proffitt v. Rohm & Haas, 850 F.2d 1007, 1011 (3d Cir. 1988) ("There are only two
limitations on the right of the citizen to bring suit. First, the citizen must give sixty days'
notice to the Administrator, the State and the alleged polluter ...." (citations omitted».
4. Id. ("Second, a citizen may not bring his or her own action if the 'Administrator
or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of
the United States ... .' ") (citing 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(b)(I)(B».
5. 110 S. Ct. 304 (1989).
6. The '~urisdictional prerequisite" approach was used by the United States Courts
of Appeals for the First, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits. Hallstrom v. Tillamook
County, 831 F.2d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 304 (1989); Garcia v. Cecos
Int'l, Inc., 761 F.2d 76, 78 (1st Cir. 1985); Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311,
316 (6th Cir. 1985); City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1976).
7. The "pragmatic" approach was used by the United States Courts of Appeals for
the Second, Third, Eighth and District of Columbia Circuits. Hempstead County and Ne
vada County Project V. EPA, 700 F.2d 459, 461-63 (8th Cir. 1983); Susquehanna Valley
Alliance V. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d 231, 243-44 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. V. Callaway, 524
F.2d 79, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1975); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. V. Train, 510 F.2d
692, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
8. See, e.g., EPA V. Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 1172, 1188
(N.D. Ind. 1989) (citing Principal Mutual Life Insurance Co. V. Juntunen, 838 F.2d 942,
944 (7th Cir. 1988», aff'd, 917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1990).
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The Supreme Court's decision in Hallstrom has resolved most of
the controversy by holding that "the notice and 60-day delay require
ments are mandatory conditions precedent to commencing suit."9
The Court, however, stated that they did not reach the issue of
whether notice is jurisdictional or procedural. lo
After the Hallstrom decision, failure to meet the sixty-day re
quirement will result in immediate dismissal in most cases. Thus, the
Hallstrom decision produces virtually the same results as the jurisdic
tional prerequisite approach. There are, however, ambiguities in the
Hallstrom decision that may allow a plaintiff to avoid dismissal in two
specific circumstances. The first is that in Hallstrom, the United
States Supreme Court addressed only the timing of notice, not the suf
ficiency. Some courts have held that a plaintiff may avoid dismissal,
even when they have not given formal notice, if the defendant had
notice-in-fact before the SUit. 11 The second circumstance is that if the
defendant fails to challenge notice in a timely fashion, the court may
find that the notice requirement has been waived.
Section I of this article discusses the language and legislative his
tory of citizen suit provisions in the context of environmental law.
Section II details the two conflicting interpretations proffered by the
pragmatic/functional and jurisdictional prerequisite courts and the
Supreme Court's response in Hallstrom. Section III analyzes the Hall
strom opinion and concludes that under this approach, while failure to
give formal notice is generally fatal to an action, in some circum
stances a plaintiff may avoid dismissal if he or she demonstrates that
the defendant received notice-in-fact more than sixty days before the
suit. Section III also concludes that a plaintiff will be unable to avoid
dismissal by arguing that the defendant has waived the notice
requirement.

I.
A.

STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND HISTORY

Statutory Language

The first citizen suit provision in a modern environmental statute
was section 304 of the Clean Air Act. 12 In subsequent legislation,
9. Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 311.
10. Id.
11. Environmental Waste Control, 710 F. Supp. at 1190-91; Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F.
Supp. 1176, 1181 (M.D. Tenn. 1988); see also Sierra Club v.Block, 614 F. Supp. 488
(D.D.C. 1985); Kitlutsisti v. Arco Alaska, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 832 (D. Alaska 1984).
12. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1706
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1988». The statute states in relevant part:
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Congress exhibited a "tendency to literally 'lift' " this section of the
Clean Air Act and, eventually, it came to be "included in all new fed
eral environmental statutes or major statutory amendments."13 Sev
eral courts have recognized that the citizen suit provisions of the
various environmental laws are essentially identical and have been
willing to use case law applying to one statute as' precedent in inter
preting similar language in other laws. 14
The notice provision of the Clean Water Act is typical of citizen
suit legislation. The statute states in relevant part:
No action may be commenced
(1) ...
(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice
of the alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State
in which the alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged
violator of the standard, limitation, or order, or
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the
United States, or a State to require compliance with the stan
dard, limitation, or order, but in any such action in a court of
the United States any citizen may intervene as a matter of
right. IS
[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own behalf
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other
governmental instrumentality ...) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an
emission standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the
Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation,
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Admin
istrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary
with the Administrator, or
(3) against any person who proposes to construct or constructs any new or
modified major emitting facility without a permit ....
Id. Prior to enactment of the citizen suit provisions, enforcement of environmental laws
were the sole responsibility of state and federal governments. Enforcement was secured by
agencies such as the EPA. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L.
No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988».
13. Miller, Private Enforcement ofFederal Pollution Control Laws, Part I, 13 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10309, 10311 (1983).
14. Hallstrom v. TiUamook County, 831 F.2d 889, 890 (9th Cir. 1987) ("At least
eight environmental statutes contain identical or similar notice provisions.... Courts have
construed these provisions identically despite slight differences in wording." (citations
omitted», aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 304 (1989); Roe v. Wert, 706 F. Supp. 788, 792 (W.D. Okla.
1989) ("No circuit has addressed the sixty (60) days notice provision of section 9659. How
ever, it is informative that some circuits have addressed the notice requirements of various
other environmental statutes.").
15. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1988). Other statutes differ slightly, reflecting structural
differences in the laws.
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By its terms, the statute presents only two prerequisites to citizen
suits: notice and an absence of government action. 16 The statute does
not expressly state whether the sixty-day provision is a jurisdictional
or procedural element. This ambiguity created "a considerable
amount of litigation and judicial confusion over the consequences of
the failure by plaintiffs to fully observe the requirement."17 In an ef
fort to interpret this ambiguity in the language of the statute, courts
have turned to the legislative history.18

B. Legislative History of Citizen Suits
The legislative history of the citizen suit provisions indicates that
the benefits and disadvantages of private suits were actively debated by
Congress. Congress viewed citizen suits as an inexpensive alternative
to government enforcement and included the citizen suit provisions in
an effort to encourage the EPA to uphold the law. 19 If the EPA failed
to adequately pursue violators, the provision would allow citizens a
private right of action to enforce the laws either by proceeding directly
against the violator or by suing the EPA itself for failure to prosecute.
Congress was also concerned that the EPA was understaffed and its
resources overstretched. 20 Proponents of the legislation anticipated
that because private citizens are the parties most directly affected by
environmental law violations, they would prove to be highly motivated
and particularly effective advocates, thus augmenting federal enforce
ment. 21 Balanced against these benefits were Congress' concerns that
allowing citizens to initiate private suits would cause a flood of litiga
tion that would block the courts and actually hinder the government's
regulatory actions. Congress also feared that large numbers of citizen
suits, lacking the centralized control of a single national agency, would
result in non-uniform or even haphazard application of environmental
laws, thereby defeating any attempt to fashion a coherent national en
vironmental policy.22 Congress expected the citizen suit provisions
"to both goad the responsible agencies to more vigorous enforce~ent
of the anti-pollution standards and, if the agencies remained inert, to
16. Proffitt v. Rohm & Haas, 850 F.2d 1007, 1011 (3d Cir. 1988).
17. See Miller, supra note 1, at 10064.
18. See. e.g., Hallstrom, 831 F.2d at 891; Garcia v. Cecos Int'l, Inc., 761 F.2d 76, 81
(1st Crr. 1985).
19. See infra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
21. See Comment, supra note 2, at 532.
22. Comment, supra note 2, at 532-33; Note, Citizen Suits and the Clean Water Act:
The Supreme Coun Decision in Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,
1988 UTAH L. REv. 891, 894.
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provide an alternative enforcement mechanism."23
Another major reason for allowing citizen suits was the realiza
tion that the existing government agencies had not energetically en
forced prior environmenta1laws. In support of the legislation, Senator
Muskie stated that "[s]tate and local governments have not responded
adequately to [the need for enforcement] .... It is clear that enforce
ment must be toughened .... More tools are needed, and the Federal
presence and backup authority must be increased. "24 Proponents of
the legislation believed that "[g]overnment initiative in seeking en
forcement under the Clean Air Act ha[d] been restrained. Author
izing citizens to bring suits for violations . . . [would] motivate
governmental . . . enforcement and abatement proceedings. "25
Opponents of the provisions claimed that by insisting on the need
for an alternative private enforcement mechanism the legislature, in
effect, suggested that the EPA could not be relied upon to fulfill its
responsibilities. 26 In response, Senator Muskie argued that citizen
suits provided a valuable source of assistance to government agencies.
"I think it is too much to presume that, however well staffed or well
intentioned these enforcement agencies, they will be able to monitor
the potential violations. "27
In sum, the legislative history supports the position that Con
gress' primary objective in enacting the citizen suit provisions was to
pressure the EPA to greater enforcement action and to supplement the
agency's resources. As one article noted, citizen suits were designed to
"expand the scope of enforcement without burdening public funds and
encourage public authorities to enforce environmentallaws."28
C.

Legislative History of the Notice Provisions

The citizen suit provisions include a special requirement that
sixty days' notice be given to the alleged polluters and to the appropri
ate federal and state government agencies. The notice requirement is a
critical element of the citizen suit provisions. The sixty-day notice re
quirement was included within the various environmental statutes for
entirely different reasons than the citizen suit provisions. The citizen
23. Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir.) (citing S. REP. No.
1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 35-36 (1970», cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979).
24. 116 CONGo REC. 16,091 (1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie).
25. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1970); Miller, supra note 1, at
10064 n.1O.
26. See Miller, supra note 1, at 10064 n.ll.
27. 116 CONGo REC. 16,116 (1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie).
28. Note, supra note 22, at 894.
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suit sections as a whole were designed as a liberal grant of power to
private parties in order to encourage compliance with environmental
laws. In contrast, the sixty-day notice requirement was viewed as a
means of limiting private participation in environmental litigation.
Specifically, the opponents of the citizen suit provisions feared that
granting wide authority to citizens to institute private actions would
result in a flood of litigation. 29 The opponents also felt that the provi
sions would hinder the enforcement efforts of the EPA by compelling
the agency to divert scarce resources to defend itself from large num
bers of potentially frivolous claims.30 As Senator Hruska remarked,
"[t]he functioning of the department could be interfered with, and its
time and resources frittered away by responding to these [citizen
suits]."31
Proponents of the citizen suit provisions therefore proposed in
serting the sixty-day notice requirement as a simple but effective
means of limiting access to the courts:
The conditions placed on such suits are intended to assure that
they will complement, and not interfere with, Federal regulatory
and enforcement programs. Citizen suits under these amendments
may only be initiated [sixty] days after the citizen has notified the
President, the State in which the alleged violation occurred, and the
alleged violator. 32

In addition to limiting access to the courts, the legislative history
supports the position that the sixty-day notice requirement was added
to the citizen suit provisions to encourage EPA enforcement, by pro
viding a window between notice and filing in which the agency could
act.33 One authority has suggested that "[t]he notice requirements
were adopted, in part, to counter those who opposed citizen suit provi
sions, purportedly fearing that citizens would flood courts with suits
29. See 116 CONGo REC. 16,115 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska).
30. [d.
31. Id.
32. Roe v. Wert, 706 F. Supp. 788,793 (W.O. Okla. 1989) (quoting S. REP. No. 51,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 62, reprinted in 1 SARA: THE SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS AND
REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1986: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 206-30 (Environmental
Institute For Waste Management Studies) (1987). The legislature intended the limits on
the award of attorney's fees to act as a restraint on frivolous litigation. See Comment,
supra note 2, at 534-35.
33. S. REp. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in Natural Resources De
fense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 723-24 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see Miller, supra note
1, at 10064 (primary purpose of the notice requirement was "to provide the government a
last opportunity to perform its enforcement functions before private attorneys general step
into the breach").
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and interfere with the proper enforcement role of the executive
branch."34 It has also been suggested that the notice requirements
represent a balancing between the fear of overburdening the EPA and
the federal courts and the necessity for private enforcement. 35 In or
der to achieve passage of the citizen suit provisions, Congress included
the notice requirement as a compromise to appease opponents of the
legislation. 36
Accordingly, it appears that the legislative purpose behind the cit
izen suit provisions as a whole is very different from the legislative
purpose underlying the specific sixty-day notice requirement. The pri
mary objective of citizen suits in general "was to 'encourage citizen
participation.' "37 Congress did not envision a restrictive role for the
private plaintiff, but rather "[t]he 'citizen suit' provision was designed
as an expansive grant of standing to private individuals . . . ."38 In
contrast, the sixty-day notice requirement was a deliberate attempt by
some members of Congress to limit the number of potential citizen
suits and provide a means for government agencies to operate without
interference from private parties. 39
The conflicting goals of the various members of Congress regard
ing citizen suits resulted in the sharp dichotomy evident in the legisla
tive history. Consequently, courts have been able to use the bifurcated
legislative history to support two contradictory positions: the sixty
day notice sections are to be read liberally in order to encourage citi
zen participation in environmental protection or, alternatively, they
are to be read restrictively, in order to free the EPA from bothersome
interference. Courts that have held that notice is only procedural in
nature often cited those sections of the legislative history that apply to
citizen suits as a whole, thereby suggesting a liberal reading. 40 Courts
that have found notice to be a jurisdictional prerequisite relied upon
the specific legislative history of the sixty-day notice requirement,
thereby supporting a more restrictive reading. 41
34. Miller, supra note I, at 10064.
35. Note, Notice by Citizen Plaintiffi in Environmental Litigation, 79 MICH. L. REV.
299, 306 (1980).
36. Miller, supra note I, at 10067.
37. Proffitt v. Municipal Auth. of Morrisville, 716 F. Supp. 837, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1989)
(quoting Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 1976», aff'd without
opinion, 897 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1990).
38. Waste Management of N. Am., Inc. v. Weinberger, 862 F.2d 1393, 1397 (9th
Cir. 1988) (quoting Parola v. Weinberger, 848 F.2d 956,959 (9th Cir. 1988».
39. Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 317 (6th Cir. 1985).
40. See cases cited supra note 7.
41. See cases cited supra note 6.
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For example, one court stated that "the citizen suits provision
reflected a deliberate choice by Congress to widen citizen access to the
courts, as a supplemental and effective assurance that the Act would
be implemented and enforced. "42 Other courts have examined the
same legislative history and found that the sixty-day notice require
ment within the citizen suit arrangement was the result of Congress'
"inten[t] to give the EPA an opportunity to resolve issues regarding
the interpretation of complex environmental standards by negotiation,
unhindered by the threat of an impending ... lawsuit,"43 thereby,
"reduc[ing] the volume of costly private [environmental] litigation."44
As a result of a legislative compromise between those favoring
and those opposing citizen suits, the legislative history demonstrated
the existence of two different purposes. Predictably, the ambiguous
language of the statute and the dichotomy of purpose evident in the
legislative history caused a split in those courts of appeals that at
tempted to construe the provisions. Section II examines the split in
the courts of appeals and the Hallstrom court's partial resolution.
II.

A.

DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS: THE PRAGMATIC/
FUNCTIONAL ApPROACH, THE JURISDICTIONAL
PREREQUISITE ApPROACH, AND THE
HALLSTROM DECISION

The Pragmatic/Functional Approach

The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third,
Eighth and District of Columbia Circuits adopted a pragmatic/func
tional approach in addressing the notice requirements of the citizen
suit provisions. 4s These opinions were marked by a distinct unwilling
ness, on policy grounds, to reject an otherwise meritorious lawsuit
solely because of a perceived technical failing. 46 As one court noted,
"[a]dherents of this view believe that strict application and enforce
ment of the notice requirement is contrary to Congress' intent in per
mitting citizen actions . . . [because this] would frustrate citizen
enforcement of the act, and treat citizens as 'troublemakers' rather
42. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 700 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
43. Walls, 761 F.2d at 317; Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 831 F.2d 889, 891 (9th
Cir. 1987) ("legislative history reftect[s] Congress's belief that ... citizen enforcement
through the courts should be secondary to administrative enforcement by the EPA"), aff'd,
110 S. Ct. 304 (1989).
44. Walls, 761 F.2d at 317.
45. See cases cited supra note 7.
46. Hallstrom, 831 F.2d at 890-91.
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than 'welcome participants in the vindication of environmental inter
ests.' "47 "Pragmatic" courts, therefore, focused on whether the
agency or violator was aware of the violation, and if so, declined to
dismiss the action even if less than sixty days' notice was given. 48
One of the earliest examples of the pragmatic approach can be
seen in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway.49 Cal
laway, in part, involved a permit question under section 404 of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act.50 The plaintiff gave notice on
July 15, 1974, and commenced suit on September 3, 1974. 51 "The
[United States] district court reasoned that the 6O-day waiting period
is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit and therefore dismissed the
claim."52
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, citing an
earlier case in which it had "held that the 60-day notice provision is
not an absolute bar to earlier suits by private citizens."53 The court
noted that a "strong additional argument" for allowing jurisdiction in
Callaway was the fact that the purpose behind the sixty-day require
ment, providing the EPA time to react, had been fulfilled. 54 In Cal
laway, the Second Circuit expressly rejected a jurisdictional
prerequisite model on the grounds that the notice requirement was
procedural and that the EPA had been given notice and had informed
the plaintiffs that they did not intend to act. 55
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit came to
a similar conclusion in Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Is
land Nuclear Reactor. 56 In Susquehanna, the EPA and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission ("NRC") were given only two days' notice
before the complaint was filed. 57 The court, however, declined to dis
miss the suit. Initially, the court noted that the NRC itself "ha[d]
taken . . . a rather pragmatic approach to the 60-day notice provi
47. Id. at 891 (citations omitted).
Id. at 890-91.
49. 524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975).
50. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988).
51. Callaway, 524 F.2d at 83.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 84 n.4.
55. Id. at 83-84.
56. 619 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1980). One authority described the Third Circuit as "the
leading proponent of the irrational formalism school" because the circuit found it "sense
less and a poor use ofjudicial resources to dismiss a case for failure to adhere to the 6O-day
notice requirement." Miller, supra note I, at 10065-66.
57. Susquehanna, 619 F.2d at 243.
48.
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sion."s8 The court quoted the NRC which had stated that the sixty
day requirement "is in the nature of a statutorily mandated jurisdic
tional exhaustion requirement designed to afford an agency an oppor
tunity to pass upon claims of alleged violations."59 The NRC also
indicated that while the suit was indeed premature, "dismissal for fail
ure to observe the 60-day condition . . . would serve no purpose."60
The NRC noted that the two federal agencies had, in fact, been "given
an opportunity to respond ... and did so prior to judicial disposition
of the complaint."61 The court agreed that requiring "dismissal and
refiling of premature suits would be excessively formalistic."62 Find
ing that the EPA had actual notice of the alleged violation, the court
concluded that "[c]ertainly, ... the complaint alleged a claim over
which the district court had subject matter jurisdiction."63
In sum, the pragmatic/functional courts "have refused to allow
'form to triumph over substance' " by declining to dismiss suits for
failure to meet the sixty-day requirement. 64 Almost all attacked the
jurisdictional prerequisite courts as being excessively formal or "overly
literal."6s At least one court suggested that it was a waste of judicial
resources to compel dismissal and refiling after perhaps years of dis
covery and pre-trial proceedings. 66
Another reason some courts of appeals adopted the pragmatic/
functional approach was based upon their interpretation of the legisla
tive history. In general, these courts relied upon those parts of the
legislative history that suggested that citizen suits were intended to be
read liberally as broad grants of power to private individuals to assist
in enforcing environmental laws. Thus, if the EPA was, in fact, aware
of the alleged violations and still chose not to act, the purpose of sixty
day notice requirement was met and dismissal of the complaint would
not serve any purpose. 67 As a result of this view of the legislature's
intent, pragmatic/functional courts concluded that notice must be
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id. (quoting Appellee's Supplemental Brief at 4).
Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. The court also noted, as had the Callaway court, that the court had in
dependent jurisdiction over the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). Id.
64. Nauen, Citizen Environmental Lawsuits After Gwaltney: The Thrill of Victory or
the Agony of Defeat?, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 327, 335 (1989).
65. Williams Pipe Line Co. v. City of Mounds View, Minn., 651 F. Supp. 551, 563
(D. Minn. 1987); see also Proffitt v. Commissioners, 754 F.2d 504, 506 (3d Cir. 1985).
66. Pymatuning Water Shed Citizens for Hygienic Env't v. Eaton, 644 F.2d 995, 996
(3d Cir. 1981).
67. Williams, 651 F. Supp. at 563-64.
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merely a procedural element. Because notice was considered only pro
cedural in nature, the courts retained the power to hear the case and
could "cure" the defective notice by, for example, granting a stay for
sixty days before proceeding with the case.
While satisfying equitable concerns, the pragmatic/functional ap
proach was plagued by several weaknesses. The approach appeared to
violate the strict language of the statute and was contrary to Congress'
stated desire that the EPA be granted sixty days to act without any
threat of interference. The approach also ignored congressional intent
that the notice requirement act as a check upon a potential flood of
litigation. Based upon these concerns, the jurisdictional prerequisite
courts found that a plaintiff must comply rigorously with the sixty-day
notice requirement before a court can have jurisdiction to hear the
case.
B.

The Jurisdictional Prerequisite Approach

Before Hallstrom, the United States Courts of Appeals for First,
Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits adopted a position that sixty days'
notice was an absolute requirement of subject matter jurisdiction68 and
that failure to give notice would result in dismissal at any point in the
proceedings. 69 Where notice was found to be jurisdictional, courts
simply had no power to act and, therefore, courts had no leeway to
grant stays or use other procedural devices to avoid dismissal. The
primary reason given for adherence to the jurisdictional prerequisite
approach was that it more closely fit a strict reading of the statutory
language and the legislative history. As one court noted, "[t]his ap
proach focuses on the plain language of the statute and the policy con
cerns underlying the notice requirement."7o
The language of most sixty-day notice provisions states only that
"[n]o action may be commenced ... before 60 days after the plaintiff
has given notice of the violation" to the appropriate parties.?) In Gar
cia v. Cecos International, Inc., 72 the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit adopted the jurisdictional approach concluding
68. See cases cited supra note 6.
69. EPA v. Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 1172, 1188 (N.D. Ind.
1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1990).
70. Hallstrom, 831 F.2d at 891.
71. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(d)(I) (1988).
72. 761 F.2d 76 (1st Cir. 1985). The Garcia case involved application of the Re
source Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982). Id. at
77-78. In Garcia, "the cause of action under RCRA was pleaded by an amended complaint
filed after removal [to federal district court]. Because of the plaintiffs' failure to grant any
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that "[t]he plain language of [the section] commands sixty days' notice
before the commencement of the suit. To accept anything less 'consti
tutes, in effect, judicial amendment in abrogation of explicit, uncondi
tional statutory language.' "73 The Garcia court further stated that
"the notice requirement is not a technical wrinkle or superfluous for
mality that federal courts may waive at will" and that it was "part of
the jurisdictional conferral from Congress that cannot be altered by
the courts. "74
Other jurisdictional prerequisite courts similarly have based their
decision to adopt this approach upon an examination of the legislative
history of the notice requirements, instead of the legislative history of
citizen suits in general. For example, in Brewer v. Ravan,7S a United
States district court utilized the jurisdictional approach stating that
the "primary purpose ... of the ... federal environmental law's notice
requirements is 'to give the EPA an opportunity to resolve issues . . .
unhindered by the threat of an impending private lawsuit,' and
thereby reduce the volume of costly private environmental litiga
tion."76 Because they focused upon a literal reading of the statute and
the legislative history of the compromise notice requirement, these
courts held that even though the requirements for citizen suits gener
ally are interpreted liberally, the notice element is a "precondition of
the district court's jurisdiction" and must be met strictly.?7
In addition, courts that applied the jurisdictional prerequisite
model have advanced several related arguments. For example, in City
of Highland Park v. Train,78 the court noted that "Congress intended
to provide for citizens' suits in a manner that would be least likely to
clog already burdened federal courts and most likely to trigger govern
mental action which would alleviate any need for judicial relief."79 As
a result, the court stated that "Congress's intention would be frus
trated if the statutory mandate . . . were ignored. "80
notice to EPA and the defendants of the lawsuit before the filing of [the] action," the court
found that it had no jurisdiction. Id. at 82.
73. Id. at 78 (quoting City of Highland Park v. Train, 374 F. Supp. 758, 766 (N.D.
Ill. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1976)).
74. Id. at 79.
75. 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn. 1988).
76. Id. at 1181 (quoting Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 317 (6th Cir.
1985)).
17. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 831 F.2d 889, 890 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 110 S.
Ct. 304 (1989).
78. ~19 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1975), cerro denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1976).
79. Id. at 690-91.
80. Id. at 691.
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The Train court's statement illustrates another reason for reading
the notice provisions strictly. If Congress intended to encourage non
judicial dispute resolution by compelling a sixty-day waiting period,
then the notice requirement should be construed strictly as an absolute
bar to jurisdiction to prevent the parties from having access to the
courts for the full sixty days. This point is illustrated further by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Hallstrom v.
Tillamook County :81
Non-judicial resolution of such conflicts is more likely if parties
consider their interests and positions in a nonadversarial setting
before suit is filed. Litigation should be a last resort only after other
efforts have failed. We believe that the "jurisdictional prerequisite"
approach is more consistent with this design than the pragmatic
approach.82

The court further stated:
[J]urisdictional interpretation of [the sixty-day notice provision]
serves better the underlying policy aims of encouraging non-judicial
resolution of environmental conflicts.... [O]nce a suit is filed, posi
tions become hardened, parties incur legal fees, and relations be
come adverianal so that cooperation and compromise is less likely.
The pragmatic approach fails to recognize that "a mere adjustment
of the trial date or the filing of a supplemental or amended com
plaint to cure defective notice cannot restore a sixty-day nonadver
sarial period to the parties. "83

The jurisdictional prerequisite courts have also found practical
reasons for requiring sixty days' formal notice as a requirement for
suit. As noted above, these courts argued that strict enforcement of
the notice requirement would encourage settlement by preventing the
inevitable hardening of positions that accompanies a lawsuit. 84 Most
persuasive to the courts of appeals, however, was the argument that
while Congress intended citizen suits in general to be a generous grant
of authority for citizen plaintiffs to act, it intended the notice require
ment to act as a check on excessive private litigation and force a wait
81. 831 F.2d 889.
82. Id. at 891-92 (citation omitted).
83. Id. at 891 (quoting Garcia v. Cecos Int'l, Inc., 761 F.2d 76, 82 (1st Cir. 1985».
Before the Supreme Court decision in Hallstrom, several courts concluded that the jurisdic
tional prerequisite approach was in line with the then existing Supreme Court precedent.
See, e.g., Roe v. Wert, 706 F. Supp. 788, 793 (W.D. Okla. 1989).
84. Hallstrom, 831 F.2d at 891; Dague v. City of Burlington, 733 F. Supp. 23,26 (D.
Vt. 1990).
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ing period in which the EPA could act unhindered. 8s
C.

Hallstrom v. Tillamook County

In Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, the United States Supreme
Court addressed the split between those courts applying the pragmatic
approach and those following the jurisdictional model. 86 The Court
concluded that sixty days' notice is a mandatory precondition to a
suit. 87 The Court declined to decide if notice is a jurisdictional or a
procedural element. 88
The plaintiffs in Hallstrom were dairy farmers who lived near a
sanitary landfill. 89 In April, 1981, the plaintiffs notified local officials
of their intention to sue Tillamook County for violations of the Re
source Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA").90 The plaintiffs
filed suit one year later. 91 The defendant moved for summary judg
ment on March 1, 1983, contending that the plaintiffs had failed to
send the required notice to the relevant state and federal agencies. 92
On March 2, 1983, the plaintiffs notified these agencies. 93
The district court found that the plaintiffs had cured any defects
in notice by their belated attempts to inform the state and federal
agencies. 94 The court noted that these agencies had not attempted to
instigate any action of their own.9S The district court concluded that
dismissal would be a waste of judicial resources and, therefore, denied
the defendant's motion. 96 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit rejected the pragmatic approach of the district court
and held that notice is an absolute requirement for jurisdiction.97 Sim
ilar to other jurisdictional prerequisite courts, the majority focused on
the "plain language of the statute" and a strict interpretation of the
"policy concerns underlying the notice requirement. "98
85. See supra note 83.
86. 1I0 S. Ct. 304 (1989).
87. Id. at 311.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 307.
90. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1) (1982 ed. and Supp. V 1987».
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 308.
96. 'Id.
97. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 831 F.2d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 1I0 S.
Ct. 304 (1989).
98. Id. Agreeing with the decision in Garcia v. Cecos Int'l, Inc., 761 F.2d 76, 78 (1st
Cir. 1985), the court of appeals focused on the policy promoting a nonadversarialresolu
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In the Supreme Court decision, Justice O'Connor, writing for the
majority, identified the issue as "whether compliance with the 60-day
notice provision is a mandatory precondition to suit or can be disre
garded by the District Court at its discretion."99 The opinion began
by noting that "the starting point for interpreting a statute is the lan
guage of the statute itself."loo After quoting RCRA's citizen suit pro
vision, the majority stated that "[t]he language of this provision could
not be clearer. Citizens may not commence actions ... until 60 days
after the citizen has notified [the appropriate parties]."101 The Court
concluded that this language "acts as a specific limitation on a citizen's
right to bring suit. [Therefore], [u]nder a literal reading of the statute,
compliance with the 60-day notice provision is a mandatory, not op
tional, condition precedent for SUit."102
The plaintiffs argued, as had the pragmatic/functional courts,
that the language should be construed flexibly and that "a 60-day stay
would serve the same function as delaying commencement of the suit"
because it would give the EPA time to act if it so desired. 103 The
majority replied that whether or not a stay is functionally the
equivalent of a delay in commencement, "such an interpretation . . .
flatly contradicts the language of the statute."I04
The plaintiffs next claimed that the sixty-day requirement should
be subject to "equitable modification and cure"I05 based on reasoning
found in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines. 106 The Court disagreed, saying
the logic in Zipes was based upon a different statute which had a no
tion of the underlying conflict. Hallstrom, 831 F.2d at 891. For a discussion of Garcia, see
supra text accompanying notes 72-74. The court noted that the sixty-day period was in
tended to allow the parties a window free of litigation in which cooperation would be more
likely. Id. The court also stated that the liberal notice standard of the pragmatic approach
would "render [the notice] provisions worthless." Id.
99. Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 307.
100. Id. at 308 (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447
U.S. 102, 108 (1980».
101. Id. at 308.
102. Id. at 309.
103. Id.
104. Id. The majority also noted that Congress had created exceptions to the notice
requirement in some RCRA provisions and that if Congress had intended, they could have
created such exceptions here. Id.
105. Id.
106. 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). In Zipes, a union brought a sex discrimination suit
against an airline under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 388. Some mem
bers of.the class had not filed on time. The court of appeals held that notice was a jurisdic
tional prerequisite to suit. Id. at 389. The Supreme Court reversed and held that notice
was subject to equitable defenses such as waiver. Id. at 393.
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tice section that was, in reality, a statute of limitations.1 07 The Court
found that the sixty-day requirement in the context of existing envi
ronmental statutes does not function as a statute of limitations.
"Rather, petitioners have full control over the timing of their suit:
they need only give notice to the appropriate parties and refrain from
commencing their action for at least 60 days. The equities do not
weigh in favor of modifying statutory requirements when the proce
dural default is caused by [the] petitioner[] .... "108
The plaintiffs, using an argument that had been raised by several
pragmatic/functional courts, claimed that a strict interpretation of the
sixty-day requirement was contrary to congressional intent. lOO The
majority countered this argument in two ways. It first noted that in
circumstances in which the language of a statute is clear, the text is
conclusive and the legislative history need not be consulted. 110 The
Court then reasoned that, even if the legislative history was consid
ered, it "indicate[d] an intent to strike a balance between encouraging
citizen enforcement of environmental regulations and avoiding bur
dening the federal courts with excessive numbers of citizen suits." III
The majority observed that a strict interpretation of the notice require
ment would therefore fulfill congressional intent in one of two ways.
It would allow the agencies to act against the violator without hinder
ance or, alternatively, it would allow a violator needed time to correct
the offending activity.ll2 Either approach would satisfy the broader
objectives of Congress by eliminating the need for a suit altogether. ll3
The plaintiffs countered that sixty days' notice merely would al
low violators an additional sixty days to continue polluting and
thereby exacerbate the environmental harm which the statute was in
tended to prevent. 114 The majority acknowledged the possibility of
this result, but held that "this problem arises as a result of the balance
107. Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 309.
108. Id The plaintiffs also argued that it is inappropriate to use an overly technical
interpretation of statutory provisions in the context of citizen suits because the plaintiffs are
often laypersons. Id. The Court countered that in this case suit was filed by an attorney,
not a layperson. Id. at 310.
109. Id.
110. Id. The Court further stated that Congress could have created exceptions to the
general notice requirement. The Court noted that Congress had previously done this with
regard to other RCRA sections, specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(I)(A). See Dague v. City
of Burlington, 733 F. Supp. 23, 25 (D. Vt. 1990).
111. Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 310 (citing 110 CONGo REc. 32,927 (1970)(statement of
Sen. Muskie); Note, supra note 35, at 301-07).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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struck by Congress in developing the citizen suit provisions."lIS
The plaintiffs also claimed that if the agencies expressed no inter
est in filing their own suits, then the forced sixty-day wait was point
less. 1l6 Justice O'Connor responded that "such a result may be
frustrating to the plaintiff" but that the argument "ignores the possi
bility that a violator or agency may change its mind."l17 Justice
O'Connor then concluded, "[w]e hold that where a party suing under
the citizen suit provisions ... fails to meet the notice and 6O-day delay
requirements ... the District Court must dismiss the action as barred
by the terms of the statute."1l8
Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented, and claimed that the
majority's decision unjustifiably frustrated congressional purpose in
creating citizen suits. 1l9 In addition, the dissent argued that it was a
waste of judicial resources to dismiss the action after a trial on the
merits.120 Finally, the dissent sought to limit the reach of the major
ity's holding by suggesting that the Hallstrom decision did not address
the question of whether notice could be waived.
Justice Marshall argued that the statutory language is not as clear
as the majority suggested. He acknowledged that "[t]here can be no
doubt that the statute requires notice before a plaintiff can file a com
plaint,"121 but noted that the statute did not define "any particular
sanction for noncompliance"122 and that "violation of a mandatory
precondition to suit does not necessarily require dismissal of the
suit."123
The dissent then turned to a similar notice section in the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act 124 and found that while the Court
previously had concluded that notice in the context of that statute was
also a mandatory precondition to suit, "[it had] nevertheless held that,
rather than dismissing the suit, the court should hold it in abeyance
for 60 days after the commencement of state proceedings, after which
115. Id. at 311.
116. Id.
117. Id. (quoting Garcia v. Cecos Int'l, Inc., 761 F.2d 76,82 (lst Cir. 1985».
118. Id. at 312.
119. Id. at 312-15 (Marshall, J., Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 312.
122. Id. at 313.
123. Id.
124. See Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 14(b), 81 Stat. 602, 607 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 633(b) (1988».
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time the grievant could continue his federal suit."12s
Addressing the policies and legislative history behind citizen suits
in the context of environmental law and citing to the majority opinion,
the dissent identified two policy objectives that Congress intended to
be satisfied by the citizen suit provisions. The first objective was to
encourage federal agency compliance with the law, and the second was
to give violators an opportunity to stop the alleged violations. 126 Cit
ing directly to the statutory history, the dissent found that "one of
Congress' purposes in enacting the citizen suit provision, of which the
notice requirement is a part, was to encourage citizen suitS."127 Turn
ing again to the majority opinion, the dissent said that "[t]he Court's
own analysis in this case makes clear that the purposes of the notice
requirement would be served equally well by a court order staying pro
ceedings for 60 days as by dismissal."128 The dissent concluded:
Where Congress intends to facilitate citizen suits, and where the
salutary purposes of the notice provision can be equally well served
by a stay as by dismissal, a regime that requires the dismissal of a
citizen suit that has "consumed the time and energy of a District
Court and the parties for nearly four years," and that has resulted
in a judicial determination ... is simply inconsistent with the will of
Congress. 129

In a footnote to the dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall sought to
limit the extent of the majority opinion and suggested a defense to
dismissal, stating:
As there is no dispute in this case that respondents timely raised the
claim that petitioner had not complied with the notice provision,
the question whether a defendant may waive the notice requirement
is not before the Court, and any "resolution" of the question is nec
essarily dictum. In any event, I do not understand the Court to
express any view on whether the notice requirement is waivable.130

The Hallstrom decision, while not deciding the technical question
of whether notice is procedural or jurisdictional, settled the issue as a
practical matter by holding that failure to meet the requirement will
result in mandatory dismissal. In so doing, the Supreme Court set a
125. Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 313 (Marshall, J., Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Oscar
Meyer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1979».
126. Id. at 314 (citing the majority opinion).
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting the majority opinion).
Id. at 313 n. *.
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firm rule that will serve to guide lower courts addressing this issue in
most cases. Questions remain, however, regarding the exact limits of
the Hallstrom decision and the strategies available for plaintiffs who
have failed to give formal notice.

III.

AFTERMATH OF HALLSTROM

In the majority of cases following Hallstrom, failure to give sixty
days' notice will be fatal to a private suit. It is also clear that in Hall
strom, the Supreme Court explicitly did not determine "whether the
'mandatory conditions precedent' were also 'jurisdictional in the strict
sense of the term' "131 or what form of notice would be sufficient. It is
important to note, however, that in Hallstrom, the Supreme Court ap
peared to tacitly support the jurisdictional model. The majority
adopted the view of the statutory history prevalent in the jurisdictional
prerequisite courts, namely, that the notice requirement was a political
compromise designed to allow the enforcement agencies time to act
unhindered by threat of private actions and, at the same time, to act as
a check upon a potential landslide of citizen suits. 132 Furthermore,
many of the plaintiff's arguments in Hallstrom were essentially the
same as those raised by the pragmatic/functional courts and the ma
jority's opinion expressly rejected each one. For example, pragmatic/
functional courts have argued that notice requirements should be con
strued flexibly to encourage citizen suits. These courts have also ar
gued that it would be a waste ofjudicial resources to dismiss a suit for
purely technical reasons. 133 The majority opinion specifically ad
dressed and repudiated both these arguments. Thus, while the
Supreme Court did not issue a definitive ruling on the theoretical na
ture of notice requirements, it resolved the issue as a practical matter
by making notice mandatory. The Court, therefore, accepted the ma
jor underlying premise of the jurisdictional prerequisite courts and re
jected the main arguments of the pragmatic/functional courts.
In contrast to the majority, the dissent adopted many of the posi
tions taken by the plaintiff and the pragmatic/functional courts. The
dissent based one argument on the need for judicial efficiency and a
second argument on the broad policies underlying citizen suits in gen
131. AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 905 F.2d 1568, 1571 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting Hallstrom,
110 S. Ct. at 311).
132. See supra text accompanying note 115; see. e.g.• EPA v. Environmental Waste
Control, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 1172, 1190 (N.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir.
1990).
133. See supra notes 45-67 and accompanying text.
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eral. I34 With regard to the latter argument, the dissent overtly ac
cepted the position, characteristic of those courts of appeals that held
notice to be a procedural issue, that Congress' primary purpose was to
encourage citizen suitS.13S Similarly to the pragmatic/functional
courts, the dissent argued that those sections of the statutory history
that advocate an expansive role for citizen suits apply equally well to
interpretations of the notice provisions in' particular. 136 The majority,
like the jurisdictional prerequisite courts, based interpretation of the
notice sections upon the more limited aspects of the statutory history
that applied directly to the notice requirements and that suggested
that these elements were designed to restrict citizen participation in
environmental actions.137
The majority opinion is closer to the literal language of the statute
and its corresponding legislative history. On its face, the statute does
require a full sixty days' notice before suit. In addition, while inter
preting the statutory language, it is more reasonable to address those
parts of the legislative history that directly apply to these specific sec
tions than to address that part of the legislative history underlying the
citizen suit provisions as a whole. Therefore, because the statutory
history supplementing the notice requirements suggests that they were
designed to afford the EPA time to act unhindered and to control the
potential flood of private suits, it seems that the majority opinion is
aligned more closely with congressional intent.
However, the effect of the majority opinion on citizen suits cannot
be ignored. After Hallstrom, a defendant may argue that any defect in
notice, perhaps even a trivial one, requires the district court to dismiss
the case immediately.138 This can be especially harsh after a full trial
on the merits has begun. Furthermore, these suits may be brought by
private individuals lacking significant resources, often against corpora
tions or government agencies with vast resources. In these circum
stances, dismissal after the plaintiffs have incurred significant costs,
and after years of effort, will appear especially unjust.
Yet, the harsh application of Hallstrom may be avoided. As one
court has noted, timing of notice is not the same as sufficiency of no
tice.139 In Hallstrom, the Supreme Court addressed only the question
134. Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 313 (Marshall, J., Brennan, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 314.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 310.
138. But see infra notes 143-211 and accompanying text.
139. EPA v. Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 1172, 1190 (N.D.
Ind. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1990).
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of when notice must be given, not what constitutes notice. l40 There
fore, the possibility remains for plaintiffs to argue that, while they may
have failed to give formal notice within sixty days, they have satisfied
congressional purpose by providing the defendant with sufficient infor
mation to constitute notice-in-(act more than sixty days before suit. 141
In addition, as noted by the Hallstrom dissent, the Court did not de
cide whether notice can be waived. 142 Therefore, it is possible that a
plaintiff may avoid dismissal if the defendant fails to challenge notice
in a timely fashion.
A.

Waiver

Before Hallstrom, the jurisdictional prerequisite courts had held
that notice is a requirement of subject matter jurisdiction. 143 A plain
tiff could not claim, therefore, that a defendant had waived notice be
cause the issue was a question of the power of the court to hear the
case. However, if notice is not a jurisdictional requirement, then the
defendant's failure to give notice may be waived if the defect is not
challenged in a timely fashion. l44
In Hallstrom, the Supreme Court did not decide whether notice is
jurisdictional or procedural. The dissent emphasized this fact and
stated that any discussion of the subject was, at best, dictum. 14s Since
the Supreme Court did not eliminate the possibility that notice is a
procedural element, there remains a limited opportunity for a plaintiff
to argue that the defendant has waived its rights to challenge notice by
failing to do so in a timely manner. A plaintiff could bolster his or her
argument by noting that the interests of judicial economy would not
be served by dismissal after a trial on the merits has begun.
While this argument remains a possibility for a plaintiff, it has
certain weaknesses. In Hal/strom, the majority opinion could be inter
preted as offering tacit support for the jurisdictional model. In declin
140. See Dague v. City of Burlington, 733 F. Supp. 23, 28 (D. Vt. 1990) ("Hal/strom
is ... distinguished by the fact that it involved the lack of notice altogether, while the
defendant here attacks the sufficiency of the letter which admittedly was provided.").
141. For example, a plaintiff may fail to give precise formal notice but may be able to
argue that informal letters or other correspondence should have put the defendant on no
tice that suit was imminent.
142. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct. 304,313 n.· (1989) (Marshall, J.,
Brennan, J., dissenting).
143. See cases cited supra note 6.
144. EPA v. Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 1172, 1188 (N.D.
Ind. 1989) ("If the notice issue is not jurisdictional, [the defendant] has waived it by failing
to raise it in a timely manner."), aff'd, 917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1990).
145. Hal/strom, 110 S. Ct. at 313 n.· (Marshall, J., Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ing to decide the issue, the Hallstrom majority stated that it was not
necessary to hold that notice "is jurisdictional in the strict sense of the
term."146 The majority further cited Fair Assessment in Real Estate
Association v. McNary,147 in which Justice Brennan concluded that a
statutory administrative exhaustion requirement was a "mandatory
precondition to suit and was in that sense a 'jurisdictional prerequi
site.' "148 Fair Assessment involved a suit for damages based upon
"the allegedly unconstitutional administration of a state tax sys
tem."149 The petitioner argued that the suit should not be dismissed
merely because they had failed to exhaust their administrative reme
dies, as required by state statute. ISO In Fair Assessment, Justice Bren
nan, while not deciding if the exhaustion requirement was a formal
element of jurisdiction, concluded that it was functionally a jurisdic
tional prerequisite and that failure to meet the statutory requirement
mandated dismissal. lSI Thus, even though the Supreme Court in
Hallstrom declined to state explicitly that notice was jurisdictional in a
strict sense, by citing Fair Assessment, the Court's opinion could be
interpreted as indicating an inclination to treat notice as if it were ju
risdictional, at least for the purposes of dismissing a suit. As a conse
quence, if called upon to do so, lower federal courts are likely to
consider the sixty-day notice requirement as functionally jurisdictional
and therefore not subject to waiver. ls2

B. Notice-In-Fact
A more effective argument than waiver is notice-in-fact. Whereas
146. Id. at 311.
147. 454 U.S. 100, 137 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
148. Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 311 (quoting Fair Assessment, 454 U.S. at 137 (Bren
nan, J., concurring in judgment».
149. Fair Assessment, 454 U.S. at 101.
150. Id. at 133.
151. Id. at 137-38 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). In Fair Assessment, Justice
Brennan was careful never to state that the statutory element in question was to be treated
as if it were an element of jurisdiction in all circumstances. Furthermore, he stated that it
was in a sense jurisdictional only after a detailed consideration of the underlying policies.
Id. at 136-38.
152. Any attempt to use a judicial efficiency argument to support a waiver defense
will likely fail. In Hallstrom, the Supreme Court demonstrated an unwillingness to allow
concerns about judicial efficiency to overcome the literal meaning of the statute. The Court
suggested that the interests of judicial economy could be served best by establishing a firm
and certain rule that all suits filed without proper notice would be dismissed. Hallstrom,
110 S. Ct. at 311-12. In addition, waiver is an equitable defense and, as can be seen from
Justice O'Connor's treatment ofthe Zipes case, arguments in equity will likely be unpersua
sive. For Justice O'Connor's treatment of Zipes, see supra notes 107-08 and accompanying
text.
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waiver assumes that notice is procedural, an assumption that is partic
ularly unlikely after Hallstrom, notice-in-fact is a doctrine that oper
ates independently of whether notice is jurisdictional or procedural.
In fact, the doctrine has been most often used by those courts that
assume that notice is an absolute prerequisite of jurisdiction and is
therefore in no way undermined by the Hallstrom decision. Use of
the doctrine of notice-in-fact in these circumstances has found some
support in the academic literature. ls3 In addition, one court has dis
tinguished Hallstrom on the basis that Hallstrom applies to circum
stances where there was no notice and not to cases in which the
sufficiency of notice is at issue. ls4
Before Hallstrom, some courts following the jurisdictional prereq
uisite approach avoided dismissing cases if they were able to find no
tice-in-fact, even if the plaintiff failed to give formal notice sixty days
in advance of suit. ISS These courts reasoned that concerns about the
sufficiency of notice raise different questions than concerns about the
timing of notice. ls6 As a result, it was not inconsistent for a court to
decide that notice should be read narrowly as an absolute prerequisite
to jurisdiction, but, at the same time, to hold that notice may be found
in a number of ways.IS7 Therefore, even if a plaintiff neglected to give
formal written notice sixty days before commencing suit, the court
might be able to assert jurisdiction on the basis of informal documents
or other written warning. Courts that use this approach often accept
the restrictive view of congressional intent proffered by the jurisdic
tional prerequisite courts, namely, that Congress intended the sixty
day limit to act as a means of affording the EPA a period of time to act
against violators without being hindered by a private suit. The courts
reasoned that Congress' purpose is fulfilled if the EPA had notice-in
fact, and thus opportunity to act, regardless of whether notice was
formal or not. This approach offers courts a flexible method of finding
notice and, therefore, retaining jurisdiction over the case. 1S8
153. See, e.g., Note, supra note 35, at 312-14.
154. Dague v. City of Burlington, 733 F. Supp. 23, 28 (D. Vt. 1990).
155. EPA v. Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 1172, 1190-91 (N.D.
Ind. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1990); Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1181
(M.D. Tenn. 1988); see also Sierra Club v. Block, 614 F. Supp. 488 (D.D.C. 1985); Kitlut
sisti v. Arco Alaska, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 832 (D. Alaska 1984).
156. See, e.g., Environmental Waste Control, 710 F. Supp. at 1190.
157. Id.
158. One court has expressly rejected the notice-in-fact doctrine. Roe v. Wert, 706
F. Supp. 788,794 (W.O. Okla. 1989) ("This Court rejects the Roes' argument that notice
in-fact saves jurisdiction.").
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In National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power CO.,IS9 a pre
Hallstrom decision, the plaintiff sent letters to the appropriate parties
more than sixty days before SUit. l60 These letters explained that the
plaintiffs intended, "after the expiration of the sixty day notice period,
... to file suit against Consumers Power Company under [the] Clean
Water Act."161 The court noted that, while the plaintiff had notified
the parties more than sixty days before filing, the plaintiff "implicitly
acknowledge[d] that it may not have complied fully with the regula
tions" governing notice. 162 These regulations state, in part:
Notice regarding an alleged violation ... shall include sufficient
information to permit the recipient to identify the specific standard,
limitation, or order alleged to have been violated, the activity al
leged to constitute a violation, the person or persons responsible for
the alleged violation, the location of the alleged violation, the date
or dates of such violation, and the full name, address, and telephone
number of the person giving notice. 163

The court stated "that although it could have been more specific,
the notice satisfied regulatory requirements" and held that the "plain
tiff gave timely and substantially complete, if not complete, notice to
the appropriate persons."I64 The court expressly found that the plain
tiff's letters gave sufficient information to allow the defendant and the
EPA to identify the law violated, the activity in question, the persons
responsible, and the dates of the alleged violations as required by the
regulations. Therefore, even though both the court and the plaintiff
acknowledged that notice was in some ways deficient, the court found
that it was sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements. Because the
court was willing to construe the regulatory requirements liberally,
and find, in effect, substantial compliance with the agency's regula
tions, the court was able to avoid dismissing the case. 16S
Other courts similarly have found jurisdiction even though the
plaintiffs did not file formal notice in precise compliance with EPA
regulations. For example, in Brewer v. Ravan,166 defendant Emhart
Industries, Inc., argued that the plaintiff's notice was "substantively
657 F. Supp. 989 (W.o. Mich. 1987), rev'd, 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 998.
Id.
Id.
40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a) (1990).
164. National Wildlife Fed'n, 657 F. Supp. at 998.
165. See Williams Pipe Line Co. v. City of Mounds View, Minn., 651 F. Supp. 551,
564 (D. Minn. 1987) ("There is nothing in the statute or regulation to suggest that the
required notice must detail the nature of each alleged violation.").
166. 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn. 1988).
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
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deficient."167 The court concluded that notice was a jurisdictional pre
requisite and acknowledged that "the notice provided by plaintiffs ar
guably was deficient in some respects" but "adequately served the
intended purpose of RCRA's notice requirement" because it defined
the law violated, the locations of the violations, the names of the par
ties giving notice and gave "a generic description of the activity al
leged to constitute the violation."168 The Brewer court, therefore,
intentionally "avoid[ed] hindrance of citizen suits through excessive
formalism" by refusing to dismiss a suit that failed to meet strict regu
latory standards by finding existing notice substantially complete. 169
The court in EPA v. Environmental Waste Control, Inc. ,170 also
found notice-in-fact. In Environmental Waste Control ("EWC"), a cit
izen group called Supporters to Oppose Pollution, Inc. ("STOP") in
tervened in a suit between the EPA and EWC, the alleged polluter. l7l
The citizen group claimed that the regular notice requirements for citi
zen suits did not apply to intervenors.172 While acknowledging that
this is normally true, the court rejected the argument because the citi
zen group's "role in this case ... ha[d] exceeded that of a mere inter
venor."173 As a result, the EPA moved for dismissal because STOP
failed to give the state environmental agency formal statutory notice
sixty days prior to suit. The court concluded, however, that the re
quired parties had received constructive notice of the alleged violation
more than sixty days before suit and, therefore, the objectives of the
notice provision had been met. 174
The court stated that Congress had intended the notice require
ment to act as a means of controlling the potential flood of citizen
suits.175 The court then reviewed the cases in both the jurisdictional
prerequisite and· pragmatic/functional circuits. and concluded that
"[a]s to the sufficiency of the notice, the reported cases consistently
have found that sufficient notice was given if the requisite parties had
167.
corporate
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 1181. In Brewer, the plaintiffs were attempting to sue the EPA and two
defendants for various federal environmental law violations. Id. at 1178.
Id. at 1181.
Id. (quoting Proffitt v. Commissioners, 754 F.2d 504, 506 (3d Cir. 1985».
710 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D. Ind. 1989), off'd, 917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1188.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1190-91.
175. Id. at 1189-90. The view generaIly taken by the jurisdictional prerequisite
courts as opposed to the position taken by the pragmatic/functional courts is that Congress
intended the notice requirements to be read libera11y in order to encourage active citizen
participation.

1991]

CITIZEN SUITS AFI'ER HALLSTROM

27

'notice-in-fact' of the alleged violations."176 Addressing the facts of
the case, the court stated:
To suggest that the state agency did not have notice-in-fact of
STOP's claims would be to ignore the record STOP has presented.
Much of STOP's case consisted of observations and reports by state
inspectors and correspondence between the state agency and Ewe
concerning violations such as STOP alleges; the state agency even
considered intervening in the EPA's suit.... Indeed, as is discussed
in sections that follow, EWe argues that the state agency had ad~
dressed or was addressing the very allegations STOP raises here.
Indiana, although not served with STOP's proposed intervenor's
complaint, had notice-in-fact of the violations STOP asserts.177
Environmental Waste Control is an important case because it
demonstrates that at least one court has been willing to find that a
defendant was put on notice, not based upon the correspondence sent
by the plaintiff, but upon the basis of the company's own internal re
ports and its correspondence with other defendants. In this case, the
alleged notice was not contained in anyone report but was inferred by
the court from a series of documents.
The doctrine of notice-in-fact can operate to mitigate the harsh
effects of the strict application of the sixty-day notice limit advanced in
Hallstrom. The doctrine allows a plaintiff to argue that letters, or
other forms of informal correspondence, constitute adequate notice.
Courts may be especially open to this argument if there is evidence,
perhaps from internal memos or otherwise, that the violator was
aware of the nature and extent of the alleged violations. In fact, notice
can even be given, not through the acts of the plaintiff, but through the
acts of third parties.
In Fishel v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 178 the defendant argued
that the plaintiffs' notice lacked information regarding the regulations
involved, the persons responsible and the alleged dates of the viola
tions.179 The court acknowledged that the notice given was "arguably
deficient" but refused to dismiss the case because state and federal en
vironmental agencies had been conducting investigations of the de
176. Id. at 1190.
177. Id. at 1191.
178. 617 F. Supp. 1531 (M.D. Pa. 1985). In Fishel, the plaintiffs were neighbors of
the defendant's manufacturing facility and waste disposal sites. Id. at 1533. The complaint
alleged various environmental law violations "in connection with the disposal of . . .
wastes." Id.
179. Id. at 1536.
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fendant for some time. ISO The court, expressing its belief that the
purpose of notice had been fulfilled, found that the defendant's knowl
edge of the agency's actions constituted a form of notice-in-fact and, in
effect, cured the technical defects in the plaintiffs' notice. lSI
Notice-in-fact has certain obvious advantages as an argument for
a plaintiff. Waiver, as an argument in equity, is often a difficult de
fense to make. This is particularly true following Hallstrom because
Hallstrom at least suggests that notice is a jurisdictional element and
therefore cannot be waived. In order to argue waiver, the defendant
must neglect to challenge a plaintiffs failure to give notice. In the
aftermath of Hallstrom, this is likely to be a rare occurrence because
defendants will move quickly for summary judgment if notice is un
timely. Notice-in-fact, however, is based upon a set of factual circum
stances that are more likely to occur. To argue notice-in-fact, a
plaintiff need only show that it has sent the defendant some form of
notice through an exchange of letters or other correspondence.
As demonstrated in cases such as Fishel and Environmental
Waste Control, courts sometimes will allow plaintiffs to cure otherwise
deficient notice by showing that a defendant had constructive notice
by virtue of being independently aware of the necessary facts that the
plaintiff failed to include in the formal notice. A defendant can obtain
this independent knowledge by being cognizant of an ongoing EPA
investigation or through the defendant's own investigatory actions.
This is particularly important for plaintiffs in the context of environ
mental litigation. For instance, some environmental laws, such as the
Clean Air Act, permit the EPA to require businesses to engage in a
measure of self-reporting. ls2 Pursuant to this statute, the EPA admin
istrator can compel a company to keep certain records or to maintain
monitoring equipment on site. IS3 The statute also provides that these
reports be open for public inspection. ls4 These records therefore pro
vide an important source of information for the purposes of demon
strating constructive notice on the part of defendants. In addition,
because of the potential liability under environmental laws such as the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil
ity Act,ISS companies may have arranged for the preparation of rou
tine in-house environmental reports in an effort to identify possible
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(1). (2) (1988).
Id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7414(c) (1988).
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
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compliance problems. Outside consultants may also be utilized to au
dit a company in order to determine if violations exist. If these and
other reports are not prepared in the context of impending litigation,
they may be available to plaintiffs through the relevant rules of discov
ery and therefore constitute a potentially important source of informa
tion about the extent of the defendant's knowledge.
Finally, especially in the case of large companies suspected of vio
lations, the EPA and state agencies conduct their own onsite investiga
tions which can be used to demonstrate that the EPA or the
defendant, if they were aware of the EPA's activity, had constructive
notice of the alleged violations.
Even informal communications between the plaintiff and defend
ant can potentially be considered "notice" for the purposes of the citi
zen suit provisions. Notice may be implied if these communications
contain evidence of an intent to sue and if the defendant is aware of
any compliance problems either through self-reporting or through in
vestigations by state or federal environmental organizations.
The doctrine of notice-in-fact does not violate the Supreme
Court's holding in Hallstrom. Hallstrom addressed omy the question
of when notice had to be given, not the contents, quality or method of
giving notice. In fact, Hallstrom indirectly offers some support to
plaintiffs using the notice-in-fact argument. Hallstrom overtly
adopted the view used by the "jurisdictional" circuits, that the sixty
day notice requirement was designed to control the flood of private
suits and give the EPA time to act unhindered by citizen suits. 186 If
the purpose of Congress was to give the EPA or the violator knowl
edge of an impending suit so that they could act to correct the situa
tion without interference, and if a defendant has in fact been notified,
even if not in a specific format or even necessarily by the plaintiff, then
the plaintiff can argue that the congressional purpose has been fulfilled
and dismissal would serve no purpose.
There must, however, be a limit. If notice is defined too infor
mally, then the purposes of the notice provision will not be met. It
would be inconsistent to adopt the strict interpretation model of Hall
strom out of a desire to give full force to the words and intent of Con
gress and then to define notice so broadly as to eviscerate the notice
requirement. Some courts have, in fact, put limits on how far they will
extend the definition of notice. In Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 187
the plaintiffs alleged that the EPA was aware of the violations com
186. Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 310.
187. 761 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1985).
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plained of and therefore had constructive notice more than sixty days
before suit. 188 In contrast to the decisions in Environmental Waste
Control and Fishel, the Walls court rejected this argument. 189 In
Walls, the court claimed that the purpose of Congress in enacting the
sixty-da}' notice requirement was to give the EPA time to act un
hindered by private suits. 190 The court required that the plaintiff "dis
tinctly and affirmatively" give full and specific notice and found
further that the defendant's mere awareness that violations existed was
insufficient. 191
In Reeger v. Mill Service, Inc., 192 the plaintiffs complained of the
operation of a nearby hazardous waste treatment plant.1 93 The de
fendant moved to dismiss, arguing it had not received statutory notice.
The plaintiffs acknowledged that they had failed to give strict formal
notice but argued that they had warned the EPA verbally and that this
was sufficient to meet the underlying purpose of the notice provi
sion. 194 In a brief decision, the court found that the oral notice was
insufficient and concluded that the unambiguous language of the stat
ute mandated dismissal when formal notice is not given. 19S
Other courts also have been strict in determining whether ade
quate notice has been given. For example, in McClellan Ecological
Seepage Situation v. Weinberger,196 the plaintiff, a citizen organization
called McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation ("MESS"), gave sixty
days' notice to the appropriate parties, including the defendant Secre
tary of Defense. 197 However, the plaintiff organization "did not pro
vide notice of its intent to sue with respect to effluent limitations and
receiving water standards for total suspended matter, suspended
solids, lead, temperature, turbidity, chlorine, and total cyanide."198
The citizen group contended that it had "'substantially complied'
with the notice provisions because it gave sixty days notice of many of
188. Id. at 317.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. 593 F. Supp. 360 (W.O. Pa. 1984).
193. Id. at 361.
194. Id. at 362.
195. Id.
196. 707 F. Supp. 1182 (E.O. Cal. 1988).
197. Id. at 1185. MESS membership consisted of citizens living near McClellan Air
Force Base in Sacramento, California. Id. In addition to alleged state law violations, the
complaint alleged violation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6987, and the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376. Id.
198. Id. at 1202.
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the violations alleged in its complaint."199
The McClellan court found that notice is a jurisdictional require
ment and that "the will of Congress expressed in the notice provisions
[should] be particularly strictly enforced where the Federal govern
ment is the defendant in a citizen suit."2°O The court therefore
concluded:
MESS's complete failure to make any reference at all to alleged vio
lations regarding total suspended matter, suspended solids, lead,
temperature, turbidity, chlorine, and total cyanide simply cannot
satisfy the requirement that a notice of intent to sue include suffi
cient information to permit the recipient to identify "the specific
standard, limitation, or order alleged to have been violated, the ac
tivity alleged to constitute a violation, the person or persons respon
sible for the alleged violation, the location of the alleged violation
[and] the date or dates of such violation."201

The court accordingly dismissed the suit for failure to meet the statu
tory standards for notice. 202
In Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. Mazur
kiewicz,203 the court also dismissed a complaint for failure to give pre
cise notice. In Mazurkiewicz, the plaintiff citizen group alleged that
notice was given to the defendant in a letter sent to a prison official. 204
The notice was allegedly contained in the following address portion of
the letter:
State Correctional Institution at Rockview
Box A
Bellefonte, PA 16823
RE: Federal Clean Water Act
Sixty (60) Day Notice
of Intent to Sue
Attention: David Lapender
Dear Mr. Lapender: 20s

The court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, stating that to sat
isfy the underlying rational of the sixty-day notice provision:
it is necessary that an alleged violator be made aware not only of the
199. Id. at 1203 n.ll.
Id. at 1203.
Id. at 1203 n.ll (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a».
Id.
203. 712 F. Supp. 1184 (M.D. Pa. 1989). In Mazurkiewicz, a citizen's environmental
protection group brought suit against a prison. Id. at 1186.
204. Id. at 1191.
205. Id. This is not the complete text of the letter.
200.
201.
202.

32

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:1

alleged violation (about which he may already know) but also that
someone else is aware of the alleged violation and that legal action is
being contempl~ted against the alleged violator. Ifthe alleged viola
tor does not receive such notice, there is much less incentive for him
or her to comply voluntarily with the federal law which he or she is
alleged to be violating. 206

The court concluded that the inside address of the letter did not con
stitute proper notice. 207
Cases like McClellan and Mazurkiewicz demonstrate that the lim
its of the doctrine of notice-in-fact remain uncertain. Even among
those courts of appeals that construe the notice requirement strictly,
there is a significant range of opinion as to what forms of informal
notice will be accepted. However, while the total number of cases in
voking the doctrine of notice-in-fact are few, certain tentative conclu
sions can be made. The first is that oral notice alone is insufficient.
This is consistent with the purpose of giving notice in that the agency
or violator should receive an unambiguous warning. Furthermore, the
substance of an oral conversation is difficult to prove in court. It is
unclear, however, if oral notice evidenced by some form of written
confirmation would be adequate. For example, it is conceivable that
notice could be found when oral notice is referred to in a subsequent
communication or when written notice, insufficient in some respect,
was clarified in subsequent oral conversations.
In addition, some courts are willing to find notice-in-fact if it is
shown that the violator or agency was aware of the alleged activity.208
For example, if the EPA had been investigating a company for some
time, or if internal company memos demonstrate an awareness of an
illegal activity, some courts have been more willing to find adequate
notice even from nonspecific letters between the plaintiff and defend
ant or from internal reports or correspondence between defendants. 209
It does not seem necessary that notice be given in only one document
or at one specific time. Notice may be found from a series of corre
spondence or other documents exchanged over a period oftime. 210 In
ternal reports or agency investigations are particularly useful in
completing otherwise defective notice. Specifically, it might be diffi
cult for a court to find adequate notice based solely upon an internal
environmental audit. One of the functions of citizen suit notice is to
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See supra notes 176-85 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
210. Id.
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alert the wrongdoer, not just that a violation has occurred, but that
someone intends to sue. Internal reports could be very useful in cur
ing notice that is deficient because, while the report mentions that a
plaintiff intends to sue, it fails to meet the precise requirements of the
EPA regulations concerning the specific laws violated and the exact
activities involved. In these circumstances a court might find it disin
genuous at best for a defendant to claim that a private letter informing
them that they were to be sued for polluting a river is insufficient no
tice when the defendant possesses numerous internal memoranda
specifying the exact nature and extent of their violations.
Courts using the doctrine of notice-in-fact generally look for the
key elements of notice: whether the defendant has been notified of the
nature of the violations, the law alleged to be violated and the intent of
a party to sue. As early as 1980, one author suggested that courts
should be willing to find notice simply if there is evidence of notice and
intent to sue more than sixty days before filing. 211 The case law since
1980 demonstrates that courts do not require all the elements of notice
to be satisfied from only one document and that even in(ormal letters
can be sufficient evidence of notice. In addition, some courts have
been receptive to arguments of notice-in-fact if the defendants were
independently aware of the violations. Courts have also been liberal in
applying the notice-in-fact doctrine if the plaintiff did attempt to give
proper notice, but failed to be sufficiently precise.
Notice-in-fact offers plaintiffs an opportunity to avoid dismissal
where the underlying purpose of the notice requirement was met but
the plaintiff failed to give notice in the formal or usual fashion. The
notice-in-fact doctrine has been applied inconsistently which renders
precise analysis difficult. Undoubtedly, it is best for citizen plaintiffs
to avoid the problem entirely by giving clear notice more than sixty
days before filing suit. If for some reason clear notice is not given in a
timely fashion, the plaintiff may pursue the doctrine of notice-in-fact.
The incomplete and occasionally confusing nature of the existing pre
cedent regarding notice-in-fact make predictions as to how the courts
will apply this doctrine difficult. It is possible that courts may find
jurisdiction based on notice-in-fact, if there is clear evidence of written
warnings of the potential for a suit, of the nature of the violation, and
of the laws allegedly broken. These warnings need not always come
211. An early article on the subject of citizen suits suggested that in deciding ques
tions of actual notice courts should look at three factors: 1) whether the parties with the
ability to "remedy the violation" received notice; 2) whether the notice indicated an intent
to sue; and 3) whether the notice came sixty days before actual suit as measured backwards
from the filing of the complaint. See Note, supra note 35, at 313-15.
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from the plaintiff and need not be in any given form. In addition, a
court may be more willing to find notice-in-fact if the agency or viola
tor was aware of the precise nature and extent of the activity alleged to
have been violative.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

The Hallstrom decision has gone a long way toward resolving the
question of the consequences of failing to give a full sixty days' notice.
Certainly, in most cases, the result will be immediate dismissal. Two
ambiguous areas remain which allow a plaintiff to argue that dismissal
would be inappropriate. First, if the defendant neglected to challenge
notice in a timely fashion, the plaintiff should argue that the defendant
has waived this issue. The second, and perhaps stronger argument, is
that if any informal documents, reports or letters were exchanged, the
plaintiff should argue that the defendant had notice-in-fact, especially
if there is evidence that the defendant was independently aware of the
nature and extent of the violations.
In most circumstances, the Hallstrom decision requires that a
plaintiff who fails to give sixty days' formal notice will face dismissal.
However, courts should be willing to examine a plaintiff's claim that
notice-in-fact was given and, in this regard, should consider the
following:
1. Does the record reveal evidence that the plaintiff gave some
form of notice, even if deficient, sixty days before suit?
2. Was this notice in writing, in the form of a letter or some
other correspondence? Did the writing indicate that suit was immi
nent and provide a rough outline of the alleged violations?
3. Can the record of the deficient notice be augmented by any
evidence of oral conversations between the plaintiff and the defendant?
4. Does the record reveal evidence that the defendant was inde
pendently aware of the nature of the violations, either from the actions
of the EPA or by internal company reports? Furthermore, was the
defendant aware that these were the violations alleged by the plaintiff?
Courts should then balance the factors listed above against the
policies underlying the sixty-day notice requirement. If the court finds
that, under the specific circumstances of the case, notice was sufficient
to satisfy the policies of giving adequate notice to the parties and en
couraging citizen participation, the courts may find that dismissal is
unnecessary .

